Attached reading materials of three sessions will evaluate three “suspects” in the “crime” of persistent underdevelopment
economics
Description
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEVELOPMENT
Assignment Paper; Requirement
“Attached reading materials of three sessions will evaluate three “suspects” in the “crime” of persistent underdevelopment: the Washington Consensus, corruption, and the so-called Dutch Disease. Please choose one of these three suspects and submit a brief (e.g. 5 pages, New roman time, 12 font, 1.5 space, citation MLA, plagiarism free) paper that declares it guilty or innocent.
The best papers will define and/or describe the suspect or phenomenon being evaluated, lay out the case against it (e.g., the mechanisms allegedly linking the suspect to the crime or problem of underdevelopment), discuss what evidence would be consistent or inconsistent with that case in the abstract (e.g., “if the Washington Consensus is really the source of underdevelopment, we should see….”), and use evidence from the real world (e.g., comparative case studies, statistics, etc.) to decide whether the case has been proven or not.”
Background based on following reading material above paper should be written but Expert can choose any to write assignment paper that declares it guilty or innocent based on any one of these three suspects the Washington Consensus, corruption, and the so-called Dutch Disease
Session : The Washington Consensus
In this session, we will discuss the so-called Washington Consensus. We will ask where it came from, what policy recommendations it included, whether they were really consensual, and to what degree and consequence they were adopted in the late 20th century.
By the end of this session you should be able to identify the key policy tools associated with the Washington Consensus, their alleged benefits, and their broad consequences in late twentieth century developing countries
Reading material: see attachments
B.C. : Williamson, John. What Washington Means by Policy Reform Peterson Institute for International Economics. 1990. pgs. 7-20.
R.A. : Naím, Moisés. Washington Consensus or Washington Confusion? Foreign Policy. 2002. pgs. 86-103
Session: Corruption and Development
This session explores the alleged relationship between corruption and development. What do we mean by “corruption?” Is it a source or a consequence of underdevelopment? How do we distinguish corruption from related concepts like “cronyism,” “patronage,” and “red tape?” Are current indicators of corruption valid? And, if not, what are the costs of their widespread utilization by business and government?
By the end if this session you should be able to define “corruption,” distinguish it from related concepts like “cronyism” and “red tape,” discuss the alleged relationship between corruption and development, and speak to the construction and validity of perceptions-based indicators of corruption like Transparency International’s “Corruption Perceptions Index.”
Reading Links
R.A. : Brademas, John, and Fritz Heimann. Tackling International Corruption. No Longer Taboo. Foreign Affairs. 1998. pgs. 17-22.
R.A. : Cobham, Alex. Corrupting Perceptions. Why Transparency International’s flagship corruption index falls short. Foreign Policy. 2013. pgs. 1-6
Session: The Resource Curse
This session will explore the relationship between natural resources and development policymaking. Do natural resources offer developing countries a bonanza on which to build? Or do they tempt developing country policymakers to pursue risky or irresponsible policies that ultimately redound to their detriment--and the detriment of their compatriots? Or does the answer depend on the particular resources and contexts of their discovery and exploitation?
By the end of this session you should be able to describe the alleged resource curse and evaluate its empirical validity, especially in regard to oil and gas. In particular, you should have a sense for whether resource wealth is a cause or consequence of underdevelopment.
Reading material: see attachments
Reading Links
R.A. : Friedman, Thomas. The First Law of Petropolitics. Foreign Policy. 154 (May/June). pgs. 28-36.
R.A. : Schrank, Andrew. Thomas Friedman Fuels a Debate. Foreign Policy. 55 (July/August). pgs. 10-1
